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THE LAW OF THE HIGH SEAS IN
TIME OF PEACE'
MYREs S. McDouGAL**

Tremendous technological changes in recent decades are
permitting multiple new uses, both constructive and destructive, of the oceans. Different peoples about the world are making increasing demands upon the oceans for the enjoyment of
both old and new uses. Unhappily, many of these demands
are not being made in terms of a common interest, designed to
secure the utmost productive use of a great sharable res6urce
through practices of reciprocity and mutual tolerance, but
rather in terms of special interest, for unilateral monopolization of the resource and the destruction of shared competence
and enjoyment. It is but one of the paradoxes of our time
that the most extravagant claims to monopolistic control over
the oceans are being put forward in the guise of preserving
"the common heritage of mankind."
Some ten years ago Professor William T. Burke and I
wrote The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary
International Law of the Sea in which we sought to examine
and appraise the historic record of the international law of the
sea. We concluded, after a survey of the record, that this law,
with a minimum of centralized organization and an economic
body of none too complex rules, had served, and continues to
serve, mankind well, allowing an inestimably greater production and wider distribution of shared values than might have
been, or might be, achieved by monopolistic control.
Today, in the face of a widespread disintegration of perceived common interests, we may be confronted with the imminent dissolution of the principles and institutions which, in
recent years at least, have served mankind so well.
To develop this theme of contemporary disintegration, I
propose to proceed under the following four main headings:
I. The Specification of the Unique Problems of the
High Seas
II. The Clarification of Basic General Community
Policies
*Adapted from a lecture delivered at the United States Naval War
College, Newport, R.I.
** Professor Myres S. McDougal received his A.B., A.M., and LL.B. from
the University of Mississippi; his B.A. and B.C.L. from the University
of Oxford; and his J.S.D. from Yale University. He is presently Sterling
Professor of Law at Yale University Law School.

46

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL.

3

III. Trends in Past Decisions with Respect to the Different Types of Problems
IV. Possible Alternatives with Respect to Emerging and
Future Problems.
I. THE

SPECIFICATIONS OF THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS OF THE HIGH SEAS

International law is the comprehensive process of authoritative decisions, transcending all territorial boundaries, by
which the peoples of the world clarify and implement their
common interests. When we look at any community, that is,
any group of people exhibiting interdeterminations and interdependences, we can observe a process of effective power.
Decisions are taken and enforced whether particular people
like it or not. Such a process is observable on a global scale.
Even the Russians, the Communist Chinese and ourselves are
scorpions in the same bottle and must take each other's decisions into account.
There are two different kinds of effective power decisions.
Some are taken by naked power, by sheer calculations of expediency in self-interests; others are taken in accordance with
general community expectations, in arenas of constituted
authority, such as courts, legislatures and executive departments. They are enforced in sufficient degree to be of community consequence; they have adequate sanctions in common
interest, reciprocity and retaliation.
These decisions, taken and enforced in accordance with
general community expectations, become, when projected on a
transnational scale, international law. International law is
much more than, as sometimes described in books, a body of
abstract rules. The rules merely describe, and often most inadequately, past decisions. International law is a living, contemporaneous process of choice, which includes both the perspectives of community members about such choices and the
operations or authoritative practices by which such choices are
put into controlling effect.
Authoritative decisions in the global community are, again
composed of two types. "Constitutional" or, preferably, constitutive decisions determine who the authorized decisionmakers are; what policies they are to follow; in what structures of
authority they are to act; what their bases of power for sanctioning purposes are to be; and what procedures they are to
follow in making all the different kinds of decisions necessary
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to clarify and implement general community policy. In the
global community, as in most communities (even those with
written constitutional documents), this constitutive process is
largely a product of the expectations people create in each
other by their continuous cooperative behavior.
The second kind of decisions, "public order" decisions, are
those that emerge from constitutive process for regulation of
a community's various value processes. These are the decisions
by which resources are allocated, planned, developed, and exploited; an environment is protected or devastated; populations are protected, regulated and controlled; an economy is
maintained or destroyed; health is fostered or neglected;
human rights are protected or denied; enlightenment is encouraged or restrained.
What is meant by "the law of the sea" may now be made
clear. The law of the sea comprises the "public order" decisions which a global constitutive process, established and maintained by all states, including the landlocked, prescribes and
applies for clarifying and securing the common interests of all
peoples in the enjoyment of the oceans. In comparable terms,
one might speak of the law of outer space, the law of international rivers, or the law of the polar regions.
What makes the law of the sea unique is the difference in
the degree to which the oceans and land masses of the world
admit of shared, non-competitive enjoyment in the production
and distribution of values. The oceans admit of shared enjoyment in high degree. Most of the resources of the oceans are
non-consumable, non-exhaustible, or renewable; by appropriate
rules their enjoyment can be made non-competitive, while remaining economic. Where one ship has just been, another can
soon come. When the initiative, energies, capital and skills of
all peoples can be brought to bear upon the enjoyment of such
a resource, the production and distribution of values can, in a
"multiplier" effect, be enormously enhanced for the benefit
of all.
The land masses of the earth do not admit of shared enjoyment in the same degree. Their relative solidity facilitates
the establishment of permanent, sedentary communities. Natural barriers such as mountains, streams, bodies of water and
deserts inhibit freedom of movement. Hence, the global constitutive process has honored the exclusive appropriation
through the organization of territorial communities, of most
land masses.
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The different territorial communities do, of course, require
some control of immediate intimate ocean areas for their own
protection and enjoyment. It is for this reason that the global
constitutive process honors their claims in relation to internal
waters, the territorial sea, contiguous zones and occasional unilateral exercises of self-defense, even upon the high seas. Such
claims are rooted in different exclusive interests. No two
states have precisely the same coastlines or precisely the same
requirements in internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous
zones, or self-defense. They are, however, common interests
in the sense that every coastal state has an interest in the
effective protection of the activities on its land mass from
activities on the oceans. The claims become expressive of special interest, and thus require rejection, only when they expand
beyond need and disregard their impact upon others.
This complementary, inclusive interest of all peoples in the
shared enjoyment of the oceans, which is commonly subsumed
under the label "freedom of the seas" for summary contrast
with the exclusive coastal state interests, is of special concern
in this discussion. It is asserted that, because of changed conditions in the exploitation of the oceans and because of the
more general desperate economic needs of the developing countries, "freedom of the seas" has become outmoded, and it is
necessary to curtail the protection the world constitutive process affords inclusive interests.

II. THE

CLARIFICATION OF BASIC GENERAL COMMUNITY POLICIES

It is necessary to begin with highest-level abstractions,
since how one perceives the whole vitally affects how one perceives the part. The first proposition I would advance is that
it is the prime responsibility of the global constitutive process, in
relation to the public order of the oceans, as in relation to any
other aspect of transnational public order, to clarify and protect the common interests of all peoples and to reject all claims
of special interests. By common interests I refer to shared
demands for values whose achievement is affected by conditions of interdependence or interdermination. By special interests I refer to those which are destructive of common interests, in the sense that the demand for values cannot be shared
even in equivalencies and that their achievement is violative
of the conditions of interdependence, imposing unnecessary
harm upon others.
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The common interests of all peoples in the enjoyment of
the oceans are, as already emphasized, of two different kinds:
inclusive and exclusive. By inclusive I refer to interests in
activities that have significant transnational effects, that is,
which importantly affect more than one territorial community.
By exclusive I refer to interests in activities which predominantly affect only one territorial community.
The inclusive interests of peoples in the enjoyment of the
oceans may be described as relating to both minimum order
and optimum order. By minimum order I refer to the conduct
of activities by the processes of persuasion and agreement,
with a minimum of unauthorized violence or other coercion.
By optimum order I refer to cooperative activity in the production and distribution of all values, in the maintenance of a
world economy and society.
The exclusive interests 6f peoples may be described, similarly, in terms of both minimum and optimum order. Every
coastal state has an interest in protecting its own internal
minimum order from coercion, whether such coercion comes
from internal or external sources. Every state also has an interest in its own internal optimum order, in the healthy functioning of its economy and society.
Recently it has been strongly urged that the developing
countries should be accorded a special width of territorial sea
and other concessions, beyond what has traditionally been regarded as in the common interest, because of their special
economic needs and as a way of righting the wrongs of a historic maldistribution of income. It is explicitly recognized that
these claims cannot be made with a promise of reciprocity to
others and that they cannot be honored except by severe
restriction of the previously protected inclusive rights of all.
These claims on behalf of the developing states are most misguided in relation to common interest. Even the developing
states could win by such extensions of their protected interests only if other states acquiesced and did not make comparable demands for extension. If a large number of other
states makes comparable demands, the sharable resource can
no longer be shared, the muliplier effect will be lost and
everyone, including the developing states, will lose. The history of the law of the sea in recent decades, when not distorted for partisan purposes, demonstrates that the oceans can
be maintained as a sharable resource open to all with the
necessary initiative, skill and capital, with tremendous bene-
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fits for all in the production and distribution of values. The
claims on behalf of the developing states are claims of special
interests both in that their demands for values cannot be
shared even in equivalences and that the conditions of their
achievement must violate interdependences with others. The
historic inequities in the distribution of income might be
better remedied by appropriate reorganization upon the land
masses than by destroying the multiplier potential of the
ocean.

III. TRENDS IN PAST DECISIONS WITH RESPECT To THE DIFFERENT
TYPES OF PROBLEMS

For many years our global constitutive process has indulged a strong presumption in favor of inclusive interests,
limiting the area of exclusive coastal interests as much as
possible and permitting their expansion only as particular
urgent purposes might require. Thus, the base line which
marked the outer boundary of "internal waters," and from
which the territorial sea was measured, was required to follow
the sinuosities of the coast, with only modest exception for
bays. It was not until the Norwegian Fisheries Case, which
rightly or wrongly found certain special needs in Norway for
fish, that this requirement began to be relaxed.
Similarly, prior to the 1960 Geneva Conference it was generally agreed that the width of the territorial sea had to be
very narrow, with most states claiming only three miles. Even
at the Geneva Conference it was agreed that states had no unilateral competence to extend their territorial sea, at the expense of the public domain, and twelve miles was regarded as
the utmost limit that anybody thought lawful.
All this consensus was in wise recognition that the territorial sea has largely ceased to serve any common interest in
the protection of exclusive coastal interests. Traditionally, the
two principal justifications -of a terriorial sea have been security and the need for fish. Yet, today, the width of the terriorial sea has practically no relation to military security: attacks can come from anywhere on the oceans or from the
other side of the moon. When special security needs arise,
they can be taken care of by contiguous zones or equivalent
concepts. Likewise, the width of the territorial sea bears little
relation to the exploitation of fisheries. Most fish simply. do
not move, breed and live within narrow bands of water off the
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coasts. It would require an enormous expropriation of the
"common heritage" for any single state to obtain control over
important stocks of fish.
The extension of unilateral competence through the device
of "contigous zones" has also been strictly limited to distances
regarded as "reasonable" for the particular purposes for which
such zones are claimed. States making special claims for the
protection of their security, customs and fiscal regulations, immigration laws, health, and so on, have been required to tailor
the zones claimed quite precisely to fit the special needs asserted, with the least possible infringement of inclusive interests. The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone goes so far, quite irrationally and impractically I think, as to limit all such claims to "twelve miles
from the base line from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured."
The recent expansion of exclusive coastal state interests
through the concept of the "continental shelf" has, as in the
case of contiguous zones, been limited more by purpose than
by distance. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, despite
its reference to a depth of 200 meters, expressly, albeitly openendedly, delimits the width of the shelf according to its "adjacency" and "exploitability." The limits in terms of purpose
are, however, clear and important. The monoploy of the coastal
state is extended only to certain exhaustible stock resources,
that is, "the minimal and other non-living resources of the
seabed and subsoil," and to certain relatively immobile organisms. The policies for distinguishing these resources relate,
quite rationally, to the economy and technology of exploitation, to the dangers of pollution, and to the potential threats
to security from fixed, relatively permanent installations. It is
expressly provided in the Convention that this limited monopoly in the coastal state is not to affect the legal status of the
superjacent waters or airspace and is not to be exercised in
any way which interferes with traditional inclusive interests.
The contemporary disintegration in perceptions of common
interest, referred to above, is reflected both in widespead assertions of a unilateral competence to extend all these areas
of exclusive interest and in occasional suggestions that there
are no good reasons for maintaining the nice historic discriminations in the purposes for which the different areas are proected, that is, the global constitutive process should honor a
single broad area of exclusive coastal interest.
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Confronted with problems of access to areas agreed to be
within the inclusive domain, the global constitutive process
has sought the utmost freedom of access for all peoples for
the greatest variety of purposes. Thus, the Geneva Convention on the High Seas not only explicitly stipulates protection
for such traditional freedoms as those of navigation, fishing,
laying of submarine cables and pipelines and flying over the
high seas, but also provides protection for a great host of
emerging new uses such as the exploitation of mineral resources, underwater transportation, climate control, ecological
conservation, power development, sea farming, storage and disposal and undersea residence. The potentialities of these emerging new uses, in the production and distribution of values
for the benefit of all peoples, staggers even an informed
imagination.
The contemporary uninformed attacks upon the "freedom
of the seas" do not directly question the importance either of
equal access or of the protection of open-ended purposes in the
enjoyment of the "high seas," but these attacks fail to perceive
that the greater the area included within the high seas, the
greater the multiplier effect from shared enjoyment in the production and distribution of values.
The particular resources of the oceans, which may be held
open for inclusive enjoyment or subjected to exclusive appropriation, vary in their bearing upon the potentialities of shared
use. There are "space-extension" resources whose distinctive
characteristic is their utility as media of movement, transportation, and communication. There are "flow" or renewable resources, of which different quantities become available at different times and which may or may not be increased or diminished by human action. Finally, there are "stock" resources, of
which the quantity is relatively fixed and which may be abundant or scarce.'
It has been a principal function of the doctrine of the
"freedom of the seas" to maintain space-extension resources,
within the area of the inclusive domain, open for shared enjoyment by all. Since any particular use of a space-extension
resource need not interfere with other uses or reduce productivity, the larger the number of participants who engage in
1 The concepts
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resources
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use, the greater is the production and distribution of values.
Hence, global constitutive process has long enforced a strong
presumption in favor of inclusive enjoyment of navigation,
flying, cable laying, pipe laying and scientific inquiry.
The principal flow or renewable resources are of course
fish. Different kinds of fish apparently differ in the degree to
which their renewability is affected by the activities of man
and have a critical point in their exploitation. Most kinds of
fish appear, however, to inhabit the oceans in such abundance as to require only modest, if any, conservation measures
for shared enjoyment. Thus, global constitutive process has,
again, decreed a strong presumption in favor of such enjoyment. Particular states have been accorded exclusive preferential rights only in cases of exceptional need, and restrictive
nmeasures for purposes of conservation have, except for a few
species, been of minimal impact. One consequence of this shared
enjoyment has been an accelerating increase in the production of food from the oceans, though many areas of the oceans
still remain largely unexplored.
The established processes of decision have as yet had little
experience with allocation of the "stock" resources (petroleum
and other minerals) of the oceans. The reservation of such resources beneath continental shelves to the coastal states has
already been noted. The disposition of such resources beneath
the surface of the deep-sea bed is presently a matter of urgent
discussion in the global arena and certain alternatives will be
examined below.
The most insistent contemporary misconceptions of common interest are comprised of increasing demands for preferential rights for coastal states with respect to fish. If agreement for an organized, inclusive enjoyment fails, comparable
demands may shortly be made with respect to the stock resources of the deep seabed.
It should not be surprising, in a relatively decentralized
and unorganized world, that peoples should find the best guarantee of inclusive enjoyment in inclusive competence. For the
making and application of law with respect to activities upon
the oceans, global constitutive process delegates a highly shared
competence to particular states. For decades, a few relatively
simple rules, and a minimum of organization, have been employed both to maintain order and to promote optimum
enjoyment.
The few rules are built upon the basic constitutive pre-
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scription that everyone is entitled to free access to the oceans
and than no one is authorized to exclude anyone else from
shared enjoyment. Every state may make and apply law to
the activities of its own ships and nationals. No state may
make and apply law to the ships of other nationals. No state
may make and apply law to the ships of other states, except
for violations of international law. And finally, and this is the
linchpin which has held the whole simple structure of shared
competence and enjoyment together, every state may ascribe
its nationality to a ship and no state may, for whatever reason, question this ascription of nationality.
The principal attack upon this structure of shared competence has come in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas
(Art. 5) which provides for a "genuine link" between a state
conferring nationality and a ship. This concept was derived
from the Nottebohm case, which fashioned it to deprive an
individual access to a tribunal for a hearing on the merits of
alleged mistreatment, and no one has ever suggested any rational meaning that might be given to it in relation to ships.
At first it was feared that the concept might be employed to
permit states unilaterally to question each other's competence
to confer nationality on ships. So far these fears have proved
unfounded, and it is to be hoped that they will remain groundless. This is not to suggest that there are not problems about
labor relations, taxation, safety and health requirements in
relation to ships that require attention. It is rather to suggest
that each of these problems has its own unique remedies and
cannot be resolved by destroying the linchpin that holds the
entire structure of shared competence together.
IV.

PossirnE ALTERNATIVES WirH RESPEcT TO EMERGING AND
FUTURE PROBLEMS

A call is being made by the General Assembly for a new
United Nations conference on the law of the sea in 1973. At
this conference the whole allocation of interests and competences between the inclusive community and coastal state will
undoubtedly be brought up for review, and, given the arrogant
contemporary perspectives of nationalism and misperceptions of
common interest, disaster may impend.
The problems that have precipitated this comprehensive review of the law of the sea are those that derive from the
newly achieved accessibility of the deep seabed and its re-
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sources. From an anthropological perspective, these particular
problems might appear to admit of solution either by an extension of the exclusive competence of states or by retention of
inclusive competence, with a choice among a number of specific
alternatives under each general option.
One alternative in exclusive competence might be to permit coastal states, under the "exploitability" criterion in the
Continental Shelf Convention, to extend their authority and
control over seabed resources up to a point in the middle of
the ocean, where they might confront each other. This approach would require an interpretation of the Continental Shelf
Convention not now generally accepted and would of course
give the bulk of the riches of the deep seabed to only a few
states.
Another alternative in exclusive competence might be to
regard the surface of the seabed and its underlying riches, as
the land masses were once regarded, as res nullus and to honor
permanent, exclusive appropriation of areas effectively occupied. This would of course reward the strong and technologically advanced states, at the expense of others, and might lead
to intense conflicts as states sought to establish new domains
of sovereignty.
Alternatives in inclusive competence would appear to admit
of an infinite variety in degrees of organization. The least organized form would be to treat the riches of the seabed as
res communis, like fish, and to allow participants in the enjoyment of the oceans to stake out claims for limited competence
over identifiable and finite submarine areas for the purpose of
exploitation. The adoption of this alternative would require
states to prescribe and apply mining laws, such as have prevailed upon the land masses. Claimants would be required to
give public notice of the areas claimed, to identify and mark
the area of operation as clearly as possible, and to commence
and complete exploitation of the designated area within a reasonable time. Such a system could be administered without
a vast international bureaucracy, and, if agreement upon more
organized inclusive competence fails, it could be this alternative which the peoples of the world will actually accept.
More organized inclusive competence could range from the
mere provision of recording or registration facilties and dispute settlement to a monopoly of production and distribution
activities by international agencies. There are literally dozens
of potential models both in variety of purpose and machinery
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of administration. In recent days the United States, through
the initiative of President Nixon, has put forward for consideration by the United Nations one such model which would
appear both magnanimous in purpose and highly complex in
its prescription and projected administration. This proposal
would mark the outer limit of comprehensive, exclusive coastal
competence over the resources of the seabed at the point where
the waters reach 200 meters in depth, establish a shared competence between coastal states and the general community
over the resources of the continental margin beyond the 200
meter point, and provide an international machinery for control
of exploration and exploitation beyond the continental margin.
From all exploitation beyond the 200 meter point royalties
would be collected for the benefit of the developing countries.
It can be expected that many comparable models will burgeon
from many other sources, official and nonofficial.
Any rational choice among the options in unorganized and
organized exploitation of the resources of the deep seabed must,
of course, depend upon the kind and quality of organization
that states can negotiate. The high potentials in, and the necessity for, the most intense cooperation, if all possible multiple
uses are to be enjoyed and protected, would appear, however,
to establish a strong presumption in favor of a high degree
of organized, inclusive competence.
A rational decision about establishing the boundaries between exclusive coastal competence and inclusive general community competence over the resources of the seabed must equally depend upon the purposes and administrative machinery that
states can negotiate. Given the legislative history of the Continental Shelf Convention, and subsequent practice and authoritative communication, including the recent North Sea case,
there would appear little doubt that coastal states may, within
the limits of "adjacency" and under the benefits of "exploitability," extend their exclusive competence to the full width
of the geologic margin. If, however, states can negotiate purposes and administrative machinery, adequate to ensure the
security and other shared exclusive interests of coastal states,
to provide for both representative and responsible participation on an inclusive basis, and to afford reasonable promise of
an enhanced and economic production of values with an equitable distribution, then common interest might suggest drawing
the outer limits of exclusive competence somewhat closer to
the shore.
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The problem of remedying a global maldistribution of income should not be permitted to blind people to the inherent
exigencies of a productive use of the oceans. When large portions of a potentially sharable resource are brought under
exclusive, monopolistic competence and control, there can only
be a diminishing of production. No matter how equitable the
formula for distribution, when the total "pie" available to be
divided is small, a share may not be worth very much. The
special problems involved in allocating a percentage of the
oceans' wealth for the benefit of the developing states or for
the support of the United Nations can, and should be, considered
on their merits, without their being intermingled with considerations about the most productive and economic employment
of resources.
In conclusion, I should like to strike hard the same note
with which I began. Law in any community serves the function of clarifying and protecting the common interests of the
members of that community. The quality of law that a community can achieve depends most fundamentally upon the perspectives of its members about their common interests: What
values they demand, how deeply they identify with the whole
community, and the comprehensiveness and realism of their
expectations about the conditions under which they can secure
their values. For one who seeks to identify with the whole
community of mankind and is concerned with the global common interest, the most urgent task is that of clarifying for the
peoples of the world the continuing tremendous advantage of
maintaining the utmost inclusive competence over, and enjoyment of, the oceans. In peroration about the beauties of a
narrow territorial sea, Professor Burke and I made an argument which applies, I think, equally to all the resources of the
oceans. We put it this way:
The positive form cf the argument for maintaining the
oceans of the world open in the greatest degree possible for inclusive use can be related in detail to every phase of the
process of interaction by which the oceans are in fact used and
enjoyed. Most importantly, the physical characteristics of the
resources sought to be enjoyed-of the oceans as a spatial-extention resource, principally useful as a domain for movement,
and of the fisheries as, for the most part, a flow or renewable
resource, without a critical zone below which depletion is technologically irreversible - establish that such resources are sharable in highest degree, promising maximium gains to all, with
a minimum of particular losses, from inclusive use. The world
social process exhibits many territorial communities, private associations, and individuals with the capabilities, and potential
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capabilities, of assisting in the exploitation of the riches of the
oceans. The ocean areas are so vast that simultaneous activities
may go forward, at the cost of only minor physical accommodations, even in the waters closest to coasts. Inclusive access to the
oceans both significantly enhances the base values of all participants in their enjoyment and increases the aggregate base
values brought to bear by the general community upon exploitation. The strategies by which resources so vast are exploited can be noncompetitive and cooperative, with a minimum of mutual interference and deprivation. The outcomes of
inclusive, cooprative enjoyment- as several centuries have
be genuinely integrative, with all winning
demonstrated -can
and none losing, in a tremendous production and wide sharing
of benefits.
It is at least incumbent upon those who dispute this posiextion either to give reasons based upon common interest or
2
plicitly to reject common interest as a basis for decision.
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